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Preface


This book originated as an attempt to relate to each other and reconcile three major subjects of my previous research: the logic of legal discourse, argumentation theories of law and the economic analysis of law.
I had the pleasure and comfort to design the main argument of this study and to work on its first draft during my research stay at the Chair for Constitutional Law and Legal Theory at the University of Kiel in 2005. I am much indebted to my host, Professor Robert Alexy, for the perfect research conditions I found in Kiel and especially for the discussions concerning many important aspects of my analyses. Professor Alexy also read substantial parts of the manuscript and provided me with many important comments.
Back at my home institution, the Chair for Theory and Philosophy of Law at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, I had the opportunity to reassume my close cooperation with Professor Jerzy Stelmach. I would like to warmly thank him for his irreplaceable help, common research projects, constant advice, stimulating discussions on legal theory and, last but not least, his friendship.
Several people read or discussed with me (parts of) the material and offered important insights and criticism. I am grateful to Professor Tomasz Gizbert- Studnicki for reading the entire manuscript and providing his valuable comments.
I would also like to thank George Pavlakos for persuading me to follow the project and for discussing much of what I wrote. Allan Beever read a large part of the book and served with his expertise of the philosophy of Kant. Ania Brożek offered her important comments on the main arguments of the book. My warm thanks are also due to Wojtek Załuski for the debates concerning discursive and economic rationality and for our close cooperation. I would also like to thank the following people for stimulating discussions concerning the problems I deal with in the book. In alphabetical order they are: Carsten Backer, Johannes Badenhop, Stefano Bertea, Martin Borowski, Andrzej Grabowski, Carsten Heidemann, Adam Olszewski, Maria Piesko, Marta Soniewicka, Nils Teifke, Adam Workowski, and Stanisław Wszołek.
I have presented some ideas developed during the preparation of this book to several audiences: at the seminars in Kiel, at the Krakauer-Augsburger Seminar in 2006 in Kraków, at the IVR Executive Committee Meeting in 2006 in Kraków, at the 2006 Meeting of the Polish Departments of Theory and Philosophy of Law in Mędzyzdroje and at the seminars both at the Faculty of Law of the Jagiellonian University and at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Pontifical Academy of Theology in Kraków. I would like to thank the participants of those gatherings for their valuable comments and critique.
A large part of the work on this book was made possible by the research fellowship I received in 2005 from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. The preparation of the final manuscript was made much easier thanks to a grant from the Foundation for Polish Science I received in 2006 within their "Homing Program".
Last but most certainly not least, I would like to thank my wife Beata for supporting me throughout the process of writing the book, as well as for her constant love and encouragement and for helping me to realize that we live in the best of possible worlds.


I dedicate this book to my Parents.

Bartosz Brożek
Kraków, February 2007

Preface
Introduction
The Point of Departure
Chapter 1
Preliminaries
1. Models of legal reasoning
2. Rules and principles theory
3. Four important concepts
3.1. Vagueness
3.2. Open-texture
3.3. Defeasibility and revisability from epistemological perspective
3.4. Defeasibility and revisability in legal discourse
3.4.1. Structural resemblance
3.4.2. Rules and principles theory
3.4.3. Conclusions
4. Robert Alexy's theory of legal reasoning
4.1. Theories of argumentation
4.2. Special Case Thesis
4.3. General practical discourse
4.4. Legal discourse
4.5. Rules, principles and the Weight Formula
Chapter 2
Problems of Legal Argumentation
1. Introductory remarks
2. Failed explanations
2.1. Na?ve deductivism and the role of logic in legal reasoning
2.1.1. Legal syllogism
2.1.2. Universalization
2.1.3. Discursive character of legal reasoning
2.2. Legal hermeneutics
2.3. Rhetoric
3. The limits of legal discourse
3.1. Practical and theoretical discourse
3.2. Special Case Thesis
3.3. The domains of legal discourse
3.3.1. Legislation
3.3.2. Application of law
4. Desiderata for constructing a normative model of legal reasoning
5. An outline of a solution
Chapter 3
The Logic of Legal Discourse
1. Introduction
1.1. Basic problems of legal logic
1.2. An outline of the chapter
2. The Weight Formula and legal argumentation
2.1. Some relevant features of Alexy's argumentation theory
2.2. The role of the Weight Formula
2.3. Logic
2.4. Conclusions
2.5. Alexy's objections
3. Defeasible logic
4. The logic of rules and principles
4.1. Rules and principles once again: a formal perspective
4.2. Classical logic with belief revision
4.3. Defeasibility of rules and principles
4.4. Comparison of the solutions
5. Reasoning by analogy
5.1. Introductory remarks
5.2. Three examples
5.3. General structure of analogy
5.4. Mistaken explanations
5.5. The Partial Reducibility Thesis
5.6. The Irreducibility Thesis
5.7. Coda
6. Conclusions
Chapter 4
Two Rationalities
1. Introduction
2. Discursive rationality
2.1. Kant's conception of practical reason
2.2. Transcendental argument
2.3. Rationality in law
2.4. Alexy's kantianism
2.5. Undecidability and the discursive justification for the existence of law .
2.6. Rules and principles
2.7. Dealing with discursively possible
2.8. Summary
3. Rational choice theory
3.1. Hobbesian rationality
3.2. Assumptions of the rational choice theory
3.3. Economic justification for the existence of law
3.4. Rational choice theory in legal reasoning
3.5. Social choice function
3.6. Posnerian Law & Economics
3.7. Moral monstrousness
3.8. Summary
4. Towards reconciliation
4.1. On the craziness of a certain idea
4.2. The Hybrid Solution
4.3. A uniform conception
4.4. Meta-choice
4.5. Summary
Chapter 5
An Outline of the Theory of Legal Discourse
1. Introduction
2. Normative model of legal discourse
3. Legal discourse as practical discourse
3.1. The Special Case Thesis Reconsidered
3.2. Rules of general practical discourse
4. A note on theoretical discourse
5. Justification for the existence of law
6. Rules and principles
7. Rules of legal discourse
8. Spheres of application
8.1. An outline of the theory of legislation
8.2. An outline of the theory of the application of law
8.3. An outline of the theory of interpretation
8.4. Other fields of application
9. Meeting the desiderata
10. Comparison with Alexy
Chapter 6
Application of Law Sensu StrictSensu Stricto
1. Introduction
2. The Wróblewski's theory
2.1. Presentation of the theory
2.2. The three examples
2.3. Case 1
2.4. Case 2
2.5. Case 3
3. Alexy's theory
3.1. Presentation of the theory
3.2. Case 1
3.3. Case 2
3.4. Case 3
4. The proposed solution
4.1. The general picture
4.2. Case 1 reexamined
4.3. Case 2 reexamined
4.4. Case 3 reexamined
5. Conclusions
Epilogue
Glimpses Back and Beyond
Bibliography
Index of Names